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Our nation is currentlyundergoing a painfulexamination of racial pro-
filing by law enforcement. At the
same time, racial profiling prac-
ticed by private individuals
remains largely unaddressed.
Too often, businesses make
police reports falsely accusing
minority group members of en-
gaging in criminal activity, such
as shoplifting, or bar them from
entry on the mere suspicion of
criminal activity.1
These wrongs may be reme-
died by civil actions that apply
two interpretations of the law
regarding the immunity that
attaches to private
citizens who file
police reports. In
specific terms, a
victim of private
racial profiling may
be able to claim a
civil rights violation
under Civil Code
Section 51 (the
Unruh Civil Rights
Act) or a cause of
action for defama-
tion under common law.2 In either
case, a civil action is possible
because filing a police report
bestows only a qualified privilege
on the accuser. For public policy
reasons, someone who mistak-
enly suspects another of shoplift-
ing and makes a police report is
shielded from a civil rights or
defamation action, but only so
long as the report is made with-
out malice. If malice is present—
for example, if the report is filed
for the purpose of harassing or
excluding a shopper or patron
because of his or her race—the
privilege is lost in most states and
as a result a civil rights or defama-
tion action lies.
This situation is complicated
in California, however, by Civil
Code Section 47(b), which pro-
vides that a communication made
during an “official proceeding”
is absolutely privileged.3 It has
long been an issue in California
whether filing a police report is
an of ficial proceeding, which
bestows an absolute privilege on
a private individual who files the
report.4 The California Supreme
Court has never ruled on this
issue. This unresolved conflict
becomes acute when private busi-
nesses file police reports that 
discriminate against shoppers 
or patrons based
on race and then
claim that Section
47(b) provides im-
munity from a Sec-
tion 51 action.
Attorneys seek-
ing to challenge a
Section 47(b) im-
munity claim can
now apply the line
of analysis that is
found in two fairly
recent California appellate court
cases—Randall v. Scovis and
Devis v. Bank of America.5 The
cases employ two dif ferent
approaches, either of which has
the potential to resolve the con-
flict between Section 51 and
Section 47(b). The facts behind
cases resulting from private racial
profiling also illustrate the clear
need to challenge the practice.
In a typical private racial pro-
filing case, a retail or other ser-
vice establishment identifies a
patron as a shoplifter, check
forger, or other criminal posing a
threat to the business for little or
no reason apart from the patron’s
race or national origin. Once pro-
filed, the patron may be subject to
blatant surveillance, aggressive
security measures, or denial of
service. The patron may even be
asked to leave or be barred from
entering the establishment.
Worse still, the establishment
may call the police and falsely
report that the racially profiled
individual committed or was
about to commit a crime, with
the result that the police ques-
tion, detain, threaten with arrest,
or arrest the patron.6
Examples of Profiling
In one case, for example, the
operators of a 7-Eleven called the
police to enforce a policy of refus-
ing African American shoppers
at all times “because the store
had recently experienced a prob-
lem with blacks shoplifting.”7 In
another, the operators of a T. J.
Maxx clothing store called the
police to remove a “suspicious”
black couple from the store, the
suspicious conduct being limited
to trying on and removing one
sweater.8 In a third case, employ-
ees at a Kmart store, after being
told to be on the lookout for a
shoplifting band of gypsies, called
the police when a family of Syrian
nationals entered.9 Sadly, these
three examples of private racial
profiling, all of which are action-
able under Section 51, are not
out of the ordinary.
The clarity with which the
California legislature has con-
demned racial discrimination, and
the totality of that condemnation,
is beyond dispute. The language
of Civil Code Section 51 is
absolute and unequivocal:
All persons within the
jurisdiction of this state are
free and equal, and no mat-
ter what their sex, race,
color, religion, ancestry,
national origin, or disabil-
ity are entitled to the full
and equal accommoda-
tions, advantages, facili-
ties, privileges, or services
in all business establish-
ments of every kind what-
ever.10
The language prevents any
manifestation of discrimination
based on race by any business
whatsoever. This prohibition was
reaffirmed in the 2000 amend-
ments to the Unruh Civil Rights
Act.11 Moreover, Civil Code Sec-
tion 52 makes available to the vic-
tim of discrimination every rem-
edy in the civil justice system,
including equitable remedies,
statutory penalties, actual dam-
ages, punitive damages, treble
damages, and attorney’s fees.
Section 52 also preserves other
independent remedies available
to the victim. The 2000 amend-
ments to Section 52 are also
utterly decisive.12
California courts have been
equally clear in their condemna-
tion of racial discrimination. They
have held that the language of
the Unruh Act is “clear and unam-
biguous,” that the act “is to be
given a liberal construction with
a view to ef fectuating its pur-
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poses,” and that all manner of discriminatory
acts by businesses, especially those that dis-
criminate based on race, are prohibited.13
The only recognized defenses to Section 51
and 52 are exceptions that are related to the
nature of the business, particularly when the
discrimination involved furthers a strong pub-
lic policy, as in, for example, affirmative action
programs or refusing to sell alcohol to
minors.14
Despite the unmistakable clarity of the
legislature and courts in their condemnation
of racial discrimination, defendants in private
racial profiling cases have availed themselves
of a legal conflict that the California Supreme
Court has yet to specifically address. These
defendants have cited Civil Code Section 47,
which confers privileges on publications that
would otherwise be actionable. Section 47(b),
in particular, confers an absolute privilege
upon a publication made in any 1) legislative
proceeding, 2) judicial proceeding, or 3) other
official proceeding authorized by law.15 Ample
precedent in a variety of contexts establishes
that “official proceedings” as used in Section
47(b) means those that resemble judicial and
legislative proceedings, such as transactions
of administrative boards and quasi-judicial
and quasi-legislative proceedings.16
A three-prong test has been articulated in
numerous cases to assess whether a gov-
ernmental agency possesses the quasi-judicial
or legislative powers that qualify its pro-
ceedings for immunity under Section 47(b).
The test considers whether the administrative
body 1) is vested with discretion based upon
investigation and consideration of eviden-
tiary facts, 2) is entitled to hold hearings
regarding the ascertained facts, and 3) has
power that affects the rights of private per-
sons.17
In addition, the statement “authorized by
law” in Section 47 indicates that the absolute
privilege under Section 47(b) is available only
if an express statutory authorization exists for
an administrative agency to exercise its offi-
cial or quasi-judicial powers. The courts have
been consistently vigilant in heeding the lan-
guage of 47(b), including the phrase “autho-
rized by law.”18 The making of a complaint to
police authorities is clearly not within the
bounds of the first or second prongs of the
test, because they relate to legislative or judi-
cial proceedings. Courts are virtually unani-
mous in categorizing police reports under
the third part of the test.19
Unanimity is lacking, however, regarding
how this third clause is to be applied. In the
context of private racial profiling, the open
question of whether Section 47(b) applies to
police reports in turn affects whether a victim
can bring a civil rights or related tort action
against the business for the profiling. If police
reports are absolutely privileged, all actions,
including Section 51 actions, are arguably
barred. If, on the other hand, police reports
receive only a qualified privilege then the
action can go forward, with the plaintiff hav-
ing the burden of establishing the intent or
malice of the defendant in connection with fil-
ing a false report. Both Randall v. Scovis and
Devis v. Bank of America offer important
insight on the limitations on the privilege
that Section 47 grants.
Randall and Applicability
The argument in Randall begins with the
premise that the applicability of the Section
47(b) privilege must be interpreted with ref-
erence to the entire Civil Code and the torts
that flow from violations of the code.20 This
means that Section 47(b) must be interpreted
with reference to the prohibition against racial
discrimination central to Sections 51 and 52,
and the torts that flow from that discrimina-
tion.21 While the relationship between Section
47(b) and Section 51 appears to be an issue
of first impression, California courts have
held that Section 47(b) does not operate to
nullify other statutory and common law
causes of action.22
One of the first cases to hold that the
Section 47(b) privilege does not nullify rights
granted elsewhere by the legislature is ITT
Telecom Products Corporation v. Dooley.23 The
court held that a defendant employee who vio-
lated the plaintiff employer’s right to protect
trade secrets under Evidence Code Section
1060 was not protected by the Section 47(b)
privilege in a subsequent action brought by
the employer for breach of an express confi-
dentiality agreement.24
ITT is cited in another case, Begier v.
Strom,25 in which the plaintiff alleged that
the defendant filed a police report that falsely
accused him of child abuse and brought a
civil action for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. The defendant argued that
because the abuse allegations were contained
in a police report, they were absolutely priv-
ileged. The trial court granted summary judg-
ment for the defendant on the claim of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress. The
appellate court reversed the trial court and
held that the defendant could be liable under
the statutory action and the tort that flowed
from it. In allowing the intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim to go forward, the
appellate court stated that applying Section
47(b) to the Child Abuse and Reporting Act
“would essentially nullify the Legislature’s
determination that liability should attach.”
The court further held that “[o]ur task is to
read statutes with reference to the whole sys-
tem of law and to avoid rendering a statute
meaningless.…”26
In March 2001, in the most expansive
application of this line of analysis to date, the
court in Randall reiterated the principles
articulated in Begier and extended them to a
civil action for invasion of privacy under Civil
Code Section 1798.53 (Information Practices
Act of 1977) for the unauthorized possession
and dissemination of confidential criminal
records in a guardianship proceeding.
Although the Randall decision was depub-
lished in June 2001, the principles it articu-
lated remain sound; a cause of action for inva-
sion of privacy by the unauthorized
possession and disclosure of criminal records
in violation of Penal Code Sections 11143 and
13300 survives the litigation privilege. The
court held that an application of the Section
47(b) privilege would strip Section 1798.53 of
meaning, that Section 1798.53 creates a civil
cause of action for invasion of privacy even
though the litigation privilege might other-
wise preclude redress for such disclosures
under certain circumstances, and that, there-
fore, a claim for invasion of privacy survives
a motion for summary judgment premised on
the Section 47(b) privilege.27
Randall implies an interpretation of
Section 47(b) that is consistent with Section
51 and the resolution of the statutory conflict.
When a defendant uses a maliciously filed
false police report to discriminate against a
patron, a limited exception to the Section
47(b) privilege must lie, and the defendant is
not insulated from liability in a Section 51
action or the torts that flow from it. A contrary
conclusion would mean that an act of racial
discrimination is privileged when the mech-
anism to carry out the discrimination is a
maliciously filed false police report. This con-
clusion would nullify the legislature’s deter-
mination that racial discrimination is unlaw-
ful. It would, in ef fect, put a racially
discriminatory action by a business beyond
the reach of Section 51.28 This directly con-
travenes the line of analysis developed in
ITT, Begier, and Randall.
Recent Amendments to Unruh
In addition, the 2000 amendments to the
Unruh Act contain language that is consistent
with the approach that Randall takes toward
resolving conflicts between Section 47(b) and
other laws. The amendments make no spe-
cific mention of Section 47(b), but they reaf-
firm the California Legislature’s total com-
mitment to the prohibition of racial
discrimination. In particular, the act’s preca-
tory language declares that the intent of the
legislature is that actions stemming from the
Unruh bill must be “independent of any other
provision of law.…”29 A plaintiff in a private
racial profiling case thus has, in ITT, Begier,
and Randall, an argument that strongly con-
travenes a defense based on Section 47(b)—
namely, that the section cannot be construed
to effectively nullify other statutes. In addition,
another line of interpretation can be found in
Devis v. Bank of America.
Devis and Common Law
The second recent argument for resolving
the conflict between Section 47(b) and Section
51 is found in Devis. The decision applies
California common law to Section 47(b).
While the California Supreme Court has long
recognized that common law is relevant in
interpreting Section 47(b) generally, Devis is
the first case to apply common law to support
the conclusion that police reports in particu-
lar receive a qualified privilege rather than an
absolute one.
Devis begins with a premise that has with-
stood the test of time: Common law is relevant
to interpreting Section 47(b). California
courts, including the supreme court, have
been relying on common law for this pur-
pose for many decades. For example, in
Silberg v. Anderson in 1990, when discussing
the scope of and policies furthered by Section
47(b), the supreme court relied on an analy-
sis of common law found in an article that was
published in 1909.30 And in Oren Royal Oaks
Venture v. Greenberg,31 the supreme court,
relying in part on the same article, states that
Section 47(b) “derives from common law
principles.…”32
Devis, in turn, cites a line of cases that
have established that the common law rule in
California has been and continues to be that
private citizens who file police reports deserve
a qualified privilege. This line includes a 1901
case, Miller v. Faro,33 which involved a plain-
tiff who was arrested by the police after hav-
ing been mistakenly identified as a seller of
stolen railroad tickets by the defendant. The
court held that the defendant could not be
liable for the mistaken identification because
in identifying the plaintiff he had acted in
good faith and added that “[n]o doubt, if a per-
son should willfully identify the wrong man as
being the criminal, for the purpose of having
him arrested and prosecuted, and on such
identification he should be arrested, such
person [would be liable].”34
A number of cases follow Miller, including
Gogue v. MacDonald,35 in which the plaintiff
alleged that the defendant reported certain
facts to a justice of the peace, who then issued
a warrant for the plaintiff’s arrest. In holding
that the plaintiff’s complaint failed to state a
cause of action, the court emphasized that
“[t]here is no allegation of bad faith, such as
willful falsity or malice, in the defendant’s
statement of the facts to the justice of the
peace.”36 Gogue was followed by Du Lac v.
Perma Trans Products, Inc,37 in which a plain-
tiff alleged that the defendants, who were
business competitors, had had him arrested
and that the defendants knew that the accu-
sations they made to the police were false.
Based on the allegedly false statements in
the police report, the plaintiff brought an
action for false imprisonment. The trial court
dismissed the complaint, but the appellate
court reversed the dismissal and, relying on
case law, held:
In our view, a different rule controls
when an arrest occurs because the
defendant knowingly gave the police
false or materially incomplete infor-
mation, of a character that could be
expected to stimulate an arrest. Such
conduct instigates, encourages, and
invites the arrest that follows; hence,
such conduct can be a basis for impos-
ing liability for false imprisonment.38
Devis, an appellate court decision from
the Fifth Division of the Second Appellate
District,39 is a recent application of this long-
standing interpretation of the qualified immu-
nity of police reports. Devis concerns a plain-
tiff patron who sued a defendant bank for
negligence and defamation based on an erro-
neous report by the bank to the police that the
plaintiff was trying to cash a stolen check. The
report lead to the defendant’s arrest and jail-
ing. The court dismissed the action in part
because the “appellants have not alleged that
the Bank acted without good faith.”40
However, in addressing the specific issue of
what type of privilege Section 47 grants to
police reports, Devis (relying, inter alia, upon
Du Lac) holds that “controlling authority
establishes that the privilege applies only if the
erroneous report to the police is made in
good faith.”41
Ample Precedent
In the course of its analysis, Devis appears
to apply precedent accurately. Correctly con-
cluding that Section 47 applies a qualified
privilege to police reports, Devis relies on
precedent dating back 100 years. The
California Supreme Court has also recog-
nized that the similarities between Section
47 and common law make the common law
authorities relevant to understanding and
applying the section.42 In addition, the hold-
ing in Devis is reinforced by the fact that even
though Section 47(b) has been amended 10
times since its enactment in 1872, the legis-
lature has never amended the section to over-
rule the century-old rule that police reports
receive a qualified privilege.
A brief review of these precedents illumi-
nates a critical point: The absolute privileges
codified in Section 47(b) for legislative, judi-
cial, and official proceedings have a different
common law source from the privilege to
communicate to the police. The Devis analy-
sis of Section 47(b) is consistent with the ear-
lier English and American precedents that
developed the privileges that were codified in
Section 47.
The legislative privilege, and particularly
the judicial and official or quasi-judicial priv-
ileges, have their source in the English rules
that sought to protect lawyers, judges, and wit-
nesses involved in the judicial process.43 The
privilege was deemed absolute because the
judge on the bench needed to be free to
administer the law without fear of conse-
quences; this independence could not exist if
judges were in daily apprehension of having
actions brought against them. For the same
reason, a similar absolute privilege was
extended to grand and petit jurors in the per-
formance of their functions, to witnesses
(whether they testified voluntarily or not and
whether their testimony was by affidavit or
deposition), to counsel in the conduct of cases,
to parties to private litigation, and to defen-
dants and prosecutors in criminal cases. The
privilege covers anything that is said in rela-
tion to the matter at issue, whether in the
pleadings, affidavits, or open court.44
This judicial privilege is, in turn, the
source of the official proceeding privilege.
The proceedings to which the absolute priv-
ilege attaches include any hearing before a tri-
bunal that performs a judicial function, ex
parte or otherwise, and regardless of whether
the hearing is public or not. This privilege
extends also to the proceedings of many
administrative officers, such as boards and
commissions, if they have judicial or quasi-
judicial powers of discretion in applying the
law to the facts.45
In contrast, publication in police reports
has only a qualified privilege extended “to
one who may act in the public interest.”46
The protection is sometimes called the pub-
lic interest privilege and applies to commu-
nications made to those who may be expected
to take official action of some kind for the pro-
tection of a public interest. This privilege
specifically includes private citizens who give
information to proper authorities for the pre-
vention or detection of crimes.47
The privilege protects false statements
that the defendant makes in good faith but not
those made with malice. The public interest
involved in the privilege is critical, but the
qualified privilege is sufficient to encourage
citizens to volunteer information concerning
criminal activity.48 As explained in Gatley’s
Libel and Slander:
Only those who act out of malice,
rather than public interest, need hesi-
tate before speaking. It is in these lat-
ter instances that “[p]roof of such indi-
rect motive will defeat the privilege
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copyright, trademark and entertainment law
which would otherwise have attached,
for it is not to the convenience and
welfare of society that false and injuri-
ous communications as to the reputa-
tion of others would be made, not for
the furtherance of some good object,
but for the gratification of an evil and
malicious disposition or for any other
object than that which gave rise to the
privilege.”49
This longstanding common law prece-
dent, however, may be subject to obfusca-
tion during a court proceeding. Specifically,
the absolute legislative, judicial, and official
privilege on the one hand, and the qualified
public interest privilege on the other, can
become confused when applied to statements
at the beginning of judicial or official pro-
ceedings—i.e., complaints to police. However,
common law avoids this confusion by extend-
ing the absolute privilege only to those com-
plaints to entities that can perform judicial
functions and extend judicial protections.
Thus, according to Prosser and Keeton’s
Torts, while the immunity extends to “every
step in the proceeding,” the absolute privilege
is limited to complaints made before entities
that have judicial or quasi-judicial authority.
Only “an informal complaint to a prosecuting
attorney or a magistrate” is to be regarded as
an initial step in a judicial proceeding.50 By
contrast, the qualified privilege applies to
complaints to entities that are neither judicial
nor quasi-judicial, such as “information to
proper authorities for the prevention and
detection of crime,”51 and, specifically, com-
plaints to police officers.52
After considering the common law ori-
gins of and policies behind these privileges,
authorities in a majority of other jurisdictions
that have analyzed this issue53 have con-
cluded, like the court in Devis, that police
reports receive a qualified privilege.
As clear as common law is, and as logical
as it appears that Section 47(b) does not nul-
lify other statutes, including Section 51, defen-
dants in private racial profiling cases may
continue to argue that citizen reports to police
enjoy unqualified immunity. Additionally, with
no applicable case on the California Supreme
Court’s docket, the dispute over the type of
privilege bestowed by Section 47 on a pri-
vate individual who files a police report will
probably not be resolved definitively in the
near future. In any case, attorneys have no
reason to believe that private racial profiling
will soon cease or that suits challenging this
unlawful practice will soon put an end to it.
Fortunately for litigators, Randall and Devis
offer two clear interpretations of the language
of Section 47(b). Randall does so by recog-
nizing an exception to 47(b) when other sig-
nificant legislation is in conflict, and Devis
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by bringing to bear common law that is the
source of the Section 47(b) privileges. Under
either analysis, a cause of action for discrim-
ination based on the malicious filing of a false
police report is preserved.                           ■
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937, 163 Cal. Rptr. 335 (1980).
38 Id. at 337.
39 See Devis v. Bank of Am., 65 Cal. App. 4th 1002, 77
Cal. Rptr. 2d 238 (1998).
40 Id. at 1008.
41 Id.
42 See Legislative Counsel’s Digest, AB 2719 (Wesson):
Civil Rights: Causes of Action: Enforcement (ch. 98,
2000); Begier v. Strom, 46 Cal. App. 4th 877, 54 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 158 (1996); Randall v. Scovis, 87 Cal. App. 4th
631, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32 (2001).
43 PROSSER & KEETON, TORTS 817-18 (5th ed. 1984)
[hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 830.
47 Id. at 819, 830.
48 See id. at 817-18; Fenelon v. Superior Court, 34 Cal.
App. 4th 607, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 291 (1990); Fridovich v.
Fridovich, 598 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1992).
49 Toker v. Pollak, 44 N.Y. 2d 211, 221, 376 N.E. 2d 163,
168 (1978) (quoting GATLEY, LIBEL & SLANDER 216 (3d
ed.)).
50 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 43, at 819.
51 Id. at 830.
52 Id. at 830 n.69. Accord 50 AM. JUR. 2d Libel & Slander
§214 (2000) (“[A] communication to a law enforce-
ment officer is generally held to be a qualified privi-
lege.”); Annotation, Libel and Slander: Privilege
Regarding Communications to Police or Other Officer
Respecting Commission of Crime, 140 A.L.R. 1466-78
(1942) (The “majority of cases expressly dealing with
[communications to the police] hold that the privilege
is qualified or conditional, not absolute.”).
53 See, e.g., Fridovich v. Fridovich, 598 So. 2d 65 (Fla.
1992). For a compilation of authorities by a California
appellate court, see Fenelon v. Superior Court, 34 Cal.
App. 4th 607 n.8 (1990).
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